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Abstract  
     In this translation draft of the first part of the author’s recently-published book 
in Japanese, entitled as “Rural-cities in Contemporary Iran: Revolution, War and the 
Structural Changes in the Rural Society,” we are presenting the preliminary 
discussions on Iranian middle-sized cities and towns which emerged in these 30 
years or so. We start from the explanations of the contents of the above-mentioned 
book and do the reviewing of the preceding studies, followed by the critical review of 
the studies on the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the studies on Iran’s recent 
political trends and the tendencies towards the local governance, which was 
tempered and collapsed with the appearance of President Ahmadīnejād. 
     This consists of the Introduction and the first parts of Chapter 1 of our book, 
and we are expecting to finish translating the whole contents and to publish it in the 
near future. We apologize for the shortcomings of this paper, for example some 
partial lack of correspondence of its bibliography with the main contents, mainly 
because of the technical reasons.  
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Introduction 
 
As a major consequence of the rapid structural changes in Iranian rural society 
which began during the 1979 revolution, Iran saw a nationwide formation of small 
towns with populations of some thousands to tens of thousands (rūstā-shahr in Persian). 
This book was written with the aim of compiling a monograph of the results of 
fieldwork, carried out in various regions of Iran between 1999 and 2001, with the 
addition of later knowledge.  
Whilst carrying out field research in Iran, which started with an examination of 
the results of population censuses since the 1960s, I observed the tendency for 
boundaries between city (shahr) and village (rūstā) to become increasingly obscured 
during recent times in post-revolutionary Iranian society. I then redefined the large-
scale villages or small cities with a population size of 2000-20,000, which occupied 
positions of a certain degree of centrality in small regions of rural society, as “rūstā-
shahr”, and carried out field research focusing on these. 
Statistics suggest that there are, at this point in time, more than 2000 villages 
and cities throughout present-day Iran that can be defined as “rūstā-shahr”, however it 
is not at all clear from documented material under what actual circumstances these 
residential areas have been placed. As the first stage in response to this, I visited 166 of 
them, and carried out a preliminary field study centered on interviews. The duration of 
my field research happened to coincide with the period of the first ever nationwide 
election for local councils (city and village council elections) in 1999, and just 
witnessed the beginning of Iran’s rural era (See [2007a]; [2008] by the author). This 
field study included conducting interviews with local council members elected in the 
first round of local governmental elections, and I treated the future prospects for local 
self-governance – still in embryonic form - as an important subject for questioning in 
the interviews.  
The second stage entailed the narrowing down of my field research to the three 
regions of Miyāne, Esfahān and Dezfūl areas, and my staying in each place for a 
relatively long time while I interviewed multiple interviewees. In so doing, the content 
of the research was in no way compromised, as it reached into the complicated matters 
of the inner regions, and that meant I was engaged in collecting more precise and 
detailed data. The field research was carried out in the three regions in 2003 (Esfahān 
area), 2005 (Miyāne area) and 2007 (Dezfūl area), continuing on after the duration of 
each initial study, and I consider it necessary still to continue the studies into the future.  
Although the view of the “formation of rūstā-shahr”, used to describe the 
structural changes of post-revolutionary modern Iranian society, was an original theory 
based on my field research, I believe it contains elements sufficiently persuasive within 
the socio-political process in Iran since then and up until the present day. Furthermore, 
my intention in this book is to indicate future prospects of how the formation of 
medium and small cities in rural village areas of Iran and influence upon the 
surrounding region (the creation of local, small-scale economic spheres etc.) could 
eventually fuel durable and internal growth and development. There has been almost no 
sociological examination conducted in recent years  - even on the international scene - 
of post-revolutionary modern Iranian rural society based on field research, and in that 
respect I believe my contribution to be not insignificant.  
Also, in addition to field-note records used throughout the process of the field 
research, I used DVC as a medium of image recording, and collected over 100 hours of 
interviews and other primary source material. My greatest objective whilst writing this 
monograph was to process and arrange the material effectively in order to present it to 
the reader in a clear and easy to understand form.  
 
It was my intention upon bringing back the results of this field research to 
compile them in a monograph straight away, but, as the reader will be aware, just 
before my return the 9.11 terrorist attacks occurred in America, and the political 
environment in the Middle East changed considerably. As a consequence, the 
democratization process in Iran that had been anticipated by my fieldwork faced 
inevitable changes, and they continue to the present day. In order to scrutinize the 
directions of recent changes, I switched my main focus to Afghanistan, and have just 
completed that research. Meanwhile I have also continued to carry out field research in 
Iran, as a follow-up on the direction of structural changes in rural societies, and have 
presented and interpreted my research results at conferences such as Japan Association 
for Middle East Studies, The Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan, World 
Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES), and International Society for Islamic 
Studies (ISIS). 
Despite varying states of development and living that a detailed examination of 
rural societies in Iran shows, in general there are many similarities nationwide in their 
history and the era of formation of these residential areas. This book strives to portray 
the present situation and its background - the structural elements that cannot be 
overlooked in modern Iranian society – a society which continues to draw extensively 
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upon the opportunities provided by diversity in rural villages, and at the same time to 
bear the mark of the whole era common to all. 
This book consists of 6 basic chapters, including the conclusion. A brief 
explanation is given below of its content and structure. Chapter 1, titled “Urbanization 
of Rural Areas in Modern Iran”, shows how the widespread urbanization phenomenon 
of rural villages in Iran provided the fundamental issues of interest for this study. The 
urbanization is deeply marked historically, in particular by the 1979 revolution and the 
Iran-Iraq War which ensued for 8 years, and that can be considered directly linked to 
the characteristic social changes called “rūstā-shahr formation”. Part 1 of Chapter 1 
puts my proposals alongside prior research, with Section 1 focusing on the 
representative research about the post-1962 agricultural revolution in Iran (so-called 
White Revolution), and Section 2 introducing the field reports and research results of 
studies of village society in Iran after the 1960s carried out continually up until the 
revolution by a Japanese research group centered around Morio Ono. This group 
continues its research of village society with fieldwork within Iran by Drs. Safīnezhād 
and Tāleb etc. at its axis, however a clear overall picture of post-revolutionary village 
society in Iran and its transformation is yet to be presented.  
Part 2 traces the political process in Iran since 1979, in particular rural strategy 
either side of the post-revolutionary war, and furthermore the direction of changes in 
society in Iran that came about through such a correlation. Divided into 3 stages, I 
discuss the first stage: the period from the revolution until the end of the Iran-Iraq War 
in 1988, which saw the most difficult political turmoil for the Iranian people, the 
second stage: reforms and the democratic movement following the appearance of 
President Khātamī in 1997, especially local administrative reforms to introduce the 
local governmental system, and the third stage: the waning of the reformists at the end 
of the Khātamī administration, and the appearance of President Ahmadīnezhād in 2005. 
In particular my consideration of the second stage is not confined to the political 
process, but addresses changes in rural finances during this period.  
Before entering into a discussion in Part 3 regarding content of fieldwork 
research, I examine and confirm the facts about social change in Iran that can be 
perceived from the social statistical data which is constantly made public by the Iranian 
government. By re-examining in Section 1 the results of the population census held in 
Iran every 10 years since 1956, I confirm the fact that the former city-village 
relationship is crumbling in post-revolution Iranian society. In Section 2 I explain the 
methods, outline and research subjects etc. of my fieldwork research carried out from 
1999 that is relevant to the main study.  
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Having thus presented my proposals, Chapters 2-5 then give an ordered account 
of the actual content of the field research. To begin, Chapter 2 makes use of the 
research results of the first stage of fieldwork on location as the main material for 
consideration, including a cross-section of rūstā-shahr all over Iran, in order to show 
that the rūstā-shahr formation process, which continues today in rural societies of Iran, 
holds onto more characteristic features common to the age than any rural variation. 
Part 1 is based on the results of preliminary stage research, attempting a 
classification of nationwide rūstā-shahr. Next, in Part 2, I describe the characteristic 
features and average picture from a cross-section of over 160 rūstā-shahr, in line with 
each research subject that gradually became refined and took shape during the process 
of preliminary research. Despite its insufficiencies, data gained from this preliminary 
research stage enables a plotting anew of the process of change in modern Iranian 
society - the so-called rūstā-shahr formation - on axis of “nationwide tendency” and 
“local variation”, and a depiction of all aspects of social change - in which modern 
rural society in Iran found itself - as post-revolutionary nationwide phenomena.  
In Chapters 3 to 5, I carry out concrete and individual examination and 
presentation of the research results for the 3 regions which were handled in some detail 
during the later stage of fieldwork. The intention here is to throw a more thorough 
picture of “face” and “region” upon the archetype example shaped by the “point”-based 
research of rūstā-shahr in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 focuses on 2 rūstā-shahr located in northwest Iran, Torkamānchāy 
and Sowmē‘e-oliyā in Miyāne region of Eastern Āzarbāyjān Province, and examines 
their involvement in development and future possibilities with the surrounding area. In 
Chapter 4 I turn to the central Iranian region of Mobāreke in Esfahān Province, and 
introduce the various troubles that have arisen due to the inauguration of a new city 
through the union of 3 neighboring villages. I also look at the example of Varzane in 
the same region, and similarly in downstream Zāyande Rūd which has developed in a 
completely different manner. Chapter 5 gives the details of development and the 
attempt at a union of 3 villages in southern region of Dezfūl in Khuzestan Province of 
southern Iran whose economic levels differ considerably. 
I believe these 3 examples to succeed in indicating both the unique and 
archetypical elements in the character of rūstā-shahr of post-revolutionary Iran. 
Statements in this book also make it clear that they will not necessarily continue to 
converge in the future. Moreover, the new regional independent centers called rūstā-
shahr have sought ways to develop under various conditions laid down by the various 
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regions within Iran, and the point I emphasise in Chapters 3 to 5 is the possibility for 
future development in diverse forms.  
Finally, the Conclusion expresses the author’s opinion on what caused the 
formation of rūstā-shahr in post-revolutionary Iran, and what significance they have for 
the future. To summarise this in one statement, the 1979 revolution was a cultural and 
social phenomenon that emerged amidst the long-term urbanization process of Iranian 
society, while the revolution and the following 8-year war with Iraq left a decisive 
mark upon the urbanization process thereafter. 
Below explains in detail the process of field research and thought which leads to 
this conclusion. 
Chapter 1 Urbanization of Rural Areas in Modern Iran 
 
 This chapter discusses 3 themes as suppositional thoughts preceding actual 
reports on the field research of “rūstā-shahr” which will unfold in Chapter 2 and 
beyond. Firstly, Part 1 gives an overview of the results of past research that has 
accumulated on the subject of rural village society in pre-revolutionary Iran. In Part 2 I 
describe the modern historical process since the 1979 revolution in Iran followed by the 
Iran-Iraq War and up until the present day, and the changes during this time in rural 
village policy. Lastly, Part 3 gives the facts concerning social statistics - the direct 
premise of this research – and I state my thoughts on the general outline of this 
fieldwork-centered research in Iran, the significance of the research subjects, and the 
methods for documentation adopted here. It is my intention to make clear the 
preconditions for the actual research reportage in Chapter 2.  
 
Part 1 Previous Research and Village Society in Pre-Revolutionary Iran  
 
 Rural society in Iran up until the early 1960s is made clear in much detail by 
A.K.S. Lambton’s classic research, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (Lambton [1953; 
later edition 1969]), and we also know from actual records from 4 villages (deh) in 
Peasants in Persia by Japan’s Morio Ono (Ono [1971]), that the rigid system of 
landowner-tenant system called mālek-ra‘īyat was an authoritarian one. i 
 From 1940s Lambton became press attaché at the then British Consulate in Iran, 
and she made use of the position to carry out widespread research on the state of 
villages in Iran. I will introduce the work Landlord and Peasant in Persia in some 
detail here in order to gain a basic understanding of villages in Iran in 1962.  
 In the Introduction titled “The Village” of this comprehensive research, 
Lambton lists the 5 main regions as (1) parts of Āzarbāyjān, (2) Arāk and Isfahān, (3) 
Sistān etc. (4) the area along the shores of the Caspian Sea, and (5) the area along the 
Persian Gulf “with its oppressively hot climate”, and goes on to summarize: “The 
village in Persia has thus been from early times the unit which formed the basis of 
social life, and the group into which the population organized themselves for economic 
and political co-operation. This importance of the village as the unit in rural life has 
persisted through medieval times down to the present day.” (Lambton [1953: 4]). 
Also Lambton writes the following about the general scene of a village. “The hamlets 
attached to the villages in most areas tend to be walled for security both against 
encroachment by raiders and against the depredation of wild animals.” She then 
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declares, “In some cases, if conditions are favourable and the hamlet grows, the 
settlement spreads beyond the original walled enclosure.” By enumerating the main 
structural elements of the village, she indicates the basic arrangement: “The central 
point of the village is the mosque (where there is one) and the village shop (if such 
exists). The larger villages in many cases have caravanserais, but these tend to be on 
the outskirts rather than in the centre of the village. The gardens in those villages 
which have gardens are usually found on the edge of the village rather than in it; the 
cultivated lands are situated in most cases round the village and farther afield, beyond 
them, are the village pastures.” (Lambton [1953: 8-9]). 
 The next point of much interest described by Lambton is the classification of 
large landowners of that time. I quote in length. “The landowning class at the present 
day can roughly be divided into the following groups. First, there are those whose 
landholdings go back several generations. In many cases it will be found that their 
family fortunes were laid by government service, which enabled a preceding generation 
in the course of its duties to acquire local influence and land, the family subsequently 
being transformed into a landowning family.  
 Secondly, there are the tribal khāns who have acquired by purchase, government 
grant, or hereditary transmission estates in or on the outskirts of their tribal territory.  
 Thirdly, there are the religious classes, who became an important element in the 
landowning class in Safavid times. In certain areas of the country, notably Āzarbāyjān 
and the neighbourhood of Isfahān, they still own considerable areas of land. Many 
members of the religious classes also hold land in the province of Kirmān. In some 
cases the fortunes of these members of the religious classes have been laid by their 
holding the office of mutavallī of some vaqf property.  
 Fourthly, there are the relatively new recruits to the landowning classes, who 
may be broadly divided into three main groups. First are the bailiffs (mubāshirs and 
kadkhudās) of the large landed proprietors who have used or misused the influence of 
their position to acquire estates for themselves. There are many such instances. 
Secondly, there are government officials, civil and military, who have acquired 
property in the areas where they have held office. This applies to all ranks from the 
sergeant or private in the former amnīyeh or gendarmerie to governors-general. Thirdly, 
there are the merchants and contractors who have invested their money in land for 
economic reasons or in order to acquire political or social prestige.” (Lambton [1953: 
261-262]). 
 A large proportion of this landowner class resided in urban areas and had 
absolute rule over the villages, while villagers and cultivators lived miserable lives of 
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never-ending plundering and injustice. Also according to Lambton, “the most 
productive land tends to be held by large landed proprietors” (Lambton [1953: 277]), 
and “The natural conditions under which agriculture are carried out would seem on the 
whole to favour large landed proprietorship, but it is clear that this advantage is more 
than offset by the disabilities resulting from the social conditions attendant upon the 
regime of the large landed proprietors in its present form.” (Lambton [1953: 280-281]). 
Also, “The general tendency is for the landowners not to encourage the peasants to 
make gardens. The reason for this is that the landowners know that the possession of 
gardens is likely to make the peasants more prosperous, and fear lest easier 
circumstances may make them independent.” (Lambton [1953: 302]). 
 The villages of Iran prior to the revolution that were ruled by the mālek-ra‘īyat 
system and are as Lambton describes above, did not incur drastic changes as a result of 
the 1962 land reforms. From 1964, soon after the land reforms, Ono began his research 
of villages in Iran, and conducted research by depicting in detail the manner of life and 
production in, in contrast to Lambton, a small number of deh (villages). His first results 
he discusses in the Introduction to Villages in Persia as below. 
 “The land reforms in Iran that began in 1963 put the mālek in order, directed 
efforts towards establishing owner farming on a wide scale, and set an agenda to put a 
stop to the mālek-ra‘īyat system. Yet the land reforms are still in progress today, and 
although the mālek-ra‘īyat system has altered its appearance, it is probably safe to say 
that in essence it survives, regulating the country’s farmers, farming industry and 
villages as closely as ever. Therefore, even now when we discuss farming industry and 
villages in Iran, it is still meaningful to talk of mālek-ra‘īyat as the basic regulating 
factor.” (Ono [1971: 18]). 
 Ono then gradually focused his interest on Kheirabad near Marvdasht in Fārs 
Province, and eventually saw in the revolution. In his last major work, 25 Years’ 
Drama of Iranian Villagers, Ono declares the following about the state of villages after 
the land reforms. “Be it post-land reforms, when I saw scenes of village families being 
made to live as if they had been tightly packed into each small room inside ghal‘e built 
of dried tiles, I immediately thought of Japanese pre-war construction sites or mining 
camps.” (Ono [1990: 26]) 
 “Wherever you went in Iran, villages were under the control of the mālek-
ra‘īyat system. As far back as villagers can recollect, village land was owned by the 
mālek landowners who largely lived in cities, while the majority of villagers had to live 
in small ghal‘e in the deh. In order to pay the excessive rent to the mālek, they had to 
wear themselves away working the māleks’ fields. They thought this was their fate that 
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would never be any different. The villagers of Kheirabad were no exception. For 
villagers of small, rural villages in remote area such as Kheirabad, land reforms on this 
scale emanating from the head of state must have been a bolt out of the blue.”(Ono 
[1990: 29]). 
 Looking back from the present day, the slow changes taking place in the 
villages of Iran after the land reforms were perhaps a prelude to the post-revolutionary 
big changes. An evaluation of the land reforms themselves is given in Lambton’s The 
Persian Land Reform, citing the comparably early period: “The changes brought about 
by the land reform in the four years between 1962 and 1966 were considerable, whether 
measured in social, political, or economic terms.” (Lambton [1969: 347]) However in 
contrast to this favourable evaluation, the criticism afforded by Hooglund straight after 
the revolution, in Land and Revolution in Iran, is severe. “The preceding analysis has 
demonstrated the most important consequence of land reform for Iranian villages: that 
the virtual absolute, and often arbitrary, political power which formerly had been the 
monopoly of the large landlords was assumed by the central government.” “Indeed, 
even remote and seemingly inaccessible villages had become subject to regular visits 
from various officials.” (Hooglund [1982: 138]). 
 Be that as it may, it is clear from the present stand-point that the dismantling of 
the landowner class, which ruled forcibly over village areas in Iran, contributed to the 
subsequent structural changes in rural village society. The influence that the revolution 
in Iran in 1979 and the following Iran-Iraq War had upon Iranian rural village society 
can be seen as a huge wave of change extending from after the land reforms.  
 Later research into the land reforms can be found in the work of Lahsaeizadeh, 
who used the theory of production models to carry out an analysis of social class 
around the time of the land reforms. Lahsaeizadeh states in his dissertation submitted in 
1984, “The implementation of the land reform was a turning point in the development 
of contemporary Iranian rural areas. The land reform and its accompanying measures 
swiftly changed the socio-economic conditions in rural areas, enhanced the 
development of differentiated agricultural enterprises and property systems, and 
thereby modified the class structure of Iranian rural communities.” (Lahsaeizadeh 
[1984: 312]). 
 Meanwhile in Japan, Akira Goto presented his work, State and Rural Society in 
the Middle East, based on field research carried out mainly in rural Fārs in the pre-
revolution era of the 1970s. Goto’s opinion of the land reforms is as follows. “The land 
reforms in Iran began within the democratic movement, but because the royal regime 
could not completely negate landowners’ interests held in the political nucleus, it 
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lacked thoroughness in terms of social justice. However, from the point of view of the 
administration advancing modernization – the formation of a social base for 
modernization and industrialization – acknowledging certain rights for landowners in 
the reforms did not necessarily come into conflict with policy objectives.” “In other 
words, in aspects of the modernization of farming society and the enlargement of the 
farming industry section of the capitalist social structure, the land reforms had a 
positive meaning for the administration at the time of the White Revolution.” (Goto 
[2002: 283-284]) 
 In general we can say that many pre-conditions are necessary for a complete 
evaluation of the land reforms, and that there is still no established evaluation to date. 
However, as the great wave of structural change overcame the village areas throughout 
Iran as a result of the 1979 revolution, practical research into the social influence of the 
land reforms in Iran is unlikely to progress further in the years to come. For example, 
regarding the difference in evaluation of the land reforms between Lambton and 
Hooglund, in present times it is difficult to decide who is more correct.  
 Similarly, Lahsaeizadeh adds a discussion of “post-revolutionary village 
structure” to his later-appearing Contemporary Rural Iran, as below. Even so, based on 
his own results of fieldwork carried out in rural Fārs, he states “There is not a clear 
determining factor of the agrarian system pattern after the revolution.” “I believe that 
with the continuation of land fragmentation the average size of Iranian independent 
farm will continue to decline in the future.”  (Lahsaeizadeh [1993: 265; 269]). In recent 
years Lahsaeizadeh has shifted direction of his research interest to “urbanization”, and 
indicates the biggest feature of “hyper-urbanization” in post-revolutionary Iran to be 
the increase in number of cities. (Lahsaeizadeh [2002: 102]). 
 As forerunning research focusing on the village in pre-revolutionary Iran, the 
achievements of Shoko Okazaki cannot be overlooked. Appearing in 1968, The 
Development of Largescale Farming in Iran (Okazaki [1968]) introduces case studies 
of farming industry mechanization in the Province of Gorgan. Later he wrote Qanāt: 
Iran’s Underground Watercourse, handling the water problem which is the largest 
cause of limitation to the farming industry in post-revolutionary Iran. It explained the 
climactic conditions governing Iranian society from a cultural and social perspective. 
 Turning to Iran itself, although the academic tradition for practical analysis of 
its village society is not necessarily strong, the sociological research of Safīnezhād, the 
author of a monograph on Talebabad, a village on the outskirts of Tehran (Safīnezhād 
[1345]), is highly acclaimed. In particular Boneh (Safīnezhād [1368]), a record of the 
traditional shared cultivation system practiced in Iran, is still frequently quoted.  
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 Greatly influenced by Ono’s field study, Tāleb of Tehran University also put 
together the key facts of this subject in 1992 in Rural Administration in Iran (Tāleb 
[1371]).  
 Ono’s Iran Diary: an Estranged and Isolated Populace and Hara Ryuichi’s 
Water and Society in Iran both mention in part the signs of great changes occurring in 
rural village areas in post-revolutionary Iran. According to Ono’s Iran Diary, “My 
impression of Kheirabad this year [1983] after 2 and a half years absence and 4 years 
since the end of the revolution, is that the government has progressed positively in its 
policies towards the villages.” It also states, “Another aspect is that the watchful gaze 
of the government has reached every corner of the villages on matters of religion and 
ideology.” (Ono [1985: 228-229]). 
 Hara has the following to say. “The fundamental policy of the Islamic 
administration is to return to policymaking favoring agriculture and nurturing small 
farmers rather than prioritizing industrialization and production as in pre-revolutionary 
times. The practitioner of this policy is the Sacred Army of Village Reconstruction 
acting in the name of Islamic economics, the main stay of its fighting force being the 
establishment of self sufficiency in agricultural production.” “One important job of the 
Sacred Army is to dissolve pre-revolutionary village governments, create Islamic 
village councils, and supervise village self-governance based on Islamic principles.” 
(Hara [1997: 147;149]). 
 This evaluation reflects the basic strategy concerning village policy of the 
revolution administration. However, in my understanding the important fact is that rural 
village societies at the center of the policy had already entered on the process of 
structural change following the land reforms. In addition was the influence of the post-
revolution Iran-Iraq War, and through this, rural society experienced its own 
urbanization process. 
 By introducing the new concept of “rūstā-shahr” - residential areas that are a 
cross between a city and village with a population size of 2000 to 20,000 - my research 
intends to trace the structural changes in the relationship of city and village in Iranian 
rural society more clearly. The positioning of rūstā-shahr at the core of small-scale 
regional society networks being newly established nationwide in every rural location in 
Iran gives clues as to the direction of future development in Iranian society.  
 Previous major research based on fieldwork handling rural village society in 
Iran is as related above, however the recent formation of rūstā-shahr, medium and 
small village-cities in Iran, is an extremely new phenomenon of only the last 30 years 
in rural village society, and during that time Iran experienced revolution and war, and 
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foreign researchers carried out almost no serious fieldwork research in the rural 
villages. It is therefore safe to say that there is no practical and detailed preceding 
research on this theme.  
 
Part 2 The Post-Revolutionary Political Process and its Social Background 
 
1. Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War 
 The Islamic Revolution in Iran, which began in early 1978 and achieved its aims 
on February 11, 1979, was one of the largest political and social upheavals in modern 
Iranian history. The Pahlavī Dynasty which had ruled since the 1920s for nearly 60 
years was toppled by the revolution, and an Islamic republic was established under the 
order of Āyatollāh Khomeynī. At the same time, what with the revolution’s impact on 
the Islamic world, influence upon the Cold War etc., it possessed so much deep 
meaning and power within the modern world - which continues to the present – that it 
cannot be treated simply as a national incident in Iran. 
 A glance at the sequence of events around the time of the revolution shows that 
on January 9, 1978, students from Qom carried out a resistance demonstration at an 
article run in the national newspaper, Etelaat about Khomeynī’s injuries, upon which 
the police opened fire and caused fatalities. Demonstrations of mourning then spread 
around the country, and by summer the anti-establishment movement had escalated to a 
nationwide scale. 
 On August 19, the Cinema Rex in Abadan was set alight, leaving several 
hundred dead. Then in the early morning of September 8, 12 cities around the country 
were put under martial law, with soldiers opening fire on demonstrators in occupied 
Tehran, and it is said the dead numbered several thousand (Black Friday). Following 
this, movements against the kingship increased in severity, and even newspapers began 
to publicly advocate Khomeynī’s name and criticize the government.  
 December 10 and 11 witnessed the mourning procession of Tazia for Ashura day, 
and a million citizens took part just in Tehran. On January 16, 1979 the King of Iran, 
Mohammad Reza Shah fled from his ancestral Iran, and Khomeynī entered Tehran by 
special plane from Paris. On February 11 Bazargan took up post as leader of a 
provisional cabinet, and on April 1 the Islamic republic was formed with the support of 
the great majority of the people.  
 The establishment of the Islamic Republic was confirmed by an overwhelming 
majority vote on April 1, 1979, and the provisional government began to make plans to 
draw up a new constitution. However, at this point discussions became complicated, 
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and the final draft prepared by a specialist committee which convened on August 18, 
quoted “Maulvi rule of Velayat-e Fagih” and in general strongly reflected the 
insistences of the religious wing.  
 From this time the Komite and Revolutionary Defense Force (sepah-e pasdaran), 
given purpose by the revolutionary administration, and other members of Hezbollah 
(Party of God) began to increase speech control, and those left-wing and ethnic 
political parties and powers, who were not of the Islamic People’s Party but who 
supported the revolution, were abolished one after another from this time until 1983. 
Also, relations worsened with America in one blow following the incident that occurred 
on November 4 involving capturing the American Embassy, as did relations with 
countries to the west as the influence of the revolution leader, Khomeynī, increased 
further. In reaction to this post-revolutionary chaos, Iraqi planes invaded on September 
22, 1980, igniting the Iran-Iraq War ii . The revolutionary administration would then 
experience an ordeal lasting 8 long years. 
 European and American research on the revolution in Iran has centered its 
viewpoint on arguments of 1) social structure and class, 2) ideology and leader versus 
the masses, 3) minorities and gender, and 4) issues of international relations with US 
relations at the axis (Suzuki [1994]).  
 The viewpoint of 1) social structure and class, relates directly to the problem of 
“who is the main body of the revolution in Iran?” On this issue Parsa argues that 
“neither rapid modernization per se, nor an emerging disjunction between economic and 
political development and the rise of a new middle class, nor uprooted populations 
instigated the conflicts that brought down the monarchy. Rather, the stage was set for 
conflict by the high level of state intervention in capital accumulation, the undermining 
of the market mechanism, and the adverse impact of these factors on major social 
groups and classes.” (Parsa [1989: 299]).  
 Against this theory of class analysis assuming the reality of people’s economics 
in Iran, is the argument, as below, that traditional Iranian society provided the starting 
point for the opposing relationship of “city-village.” “It is clear that elements of the 
migrant poor, like other groups of Iranians, rose against the Shah’s regime.” Also, 
“their participation was important both in providing numerical support to the 
antiregime forces and as a highly significant symbolic outcry by the poor against the 
injustices of the Iranian political and social system.” (Kazemi [1980: 88; 96]). 
 Thus, approaching the revolution in Iran from the angles of social structure and 
social class means a great divide in viewpoint between considering the main cause of 
the revolution to be a class struggle, and considering it an urbanization phenomenon 
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peculiar to the Third World. The argument in this book stands closer to the latter 
viewpoint, however my chief concern is directed towards the post-revolutionary process 
of change, rather than any causal theory for the revolution.  
 Here we will glance at discussions representative of the other angles from which 
the revolution in Iran is viewed. 2) Concerning the issue of ideology and the masses 
versus leaders, a typical argument defending Khomeynī’s revolutionary theory is the 
below declaration from H. Algar. “It was as a result of this [Khomeynī’s] trust in Allah, 
of this solitude with Allah, this deprivation of any form of wordly [sic] support and this 
reliance on the support of Allah – a reliance which was clearly testified through the 
martyrdom of not less than 100,000 people in the year of struggle – that ultimately the 
Revolution in Iran was able to succeed.” (Siddiqui [1980: 62]). 
 In contrast, Dabashi introduces a more analytical angle, writing about the 
peculiarities of an ideology which brings about revolution, “beyond its material causes, 
the ideological, mythical and theological dimensions of a revolution give communal 
expression to man’s most moving precept: Discontent.” (Dabashi [1993: 489]). 
 Abrahamian takes this argument further, coming to the conclusion, that, 
‘“populism” is a more apt term for describing Khomeini, his ideas, and his movement 
because this term is associated with ideological adaptability and intellectual flexibility, 
with political protests against the established order, and with socioeconomic issues that 
fuel mass opposition to the status quo’ (Abrahamian[1993: 2]). 
 An absolute follower of Khomeynī’s revolutionary thought, the Ahmadīnezhād 
administration took power from 2005, and its populist methods brought about a certain 
degree of success. In these circumstances, once more we get a strong sense of what 
seems to be Abrahamian’s extremely simplified argument penetrating the essence of the 
revolutionary thought. 
 3) Minority and gender issues are discussions concerning post-revolutionary 
Iranian society rather than revolutionary theory, and, in particular, together with the 
issue of the young generation which has constituted a large part of the population since 
the rise to power of reformist, President Khātamī in 1997, attract much interest. 
However the situation pertaining to minority issues around the time of the revolution 
appears to be largely one of “continuity rather than change”. For example, Koohi-
Kamali states the following about the situation in which the Kurds found themselves as 
a result of the revolution. “The Iranian revolution, which was welcomed as the 
harbinger of democracy in Iran by those opposed to the Shah, failed to live up to the 
expectation of the people. Despite promises, the Kurds were treated very harshly. Later, 
the war between Iran and Iraq was thought to provide a golden opportunity for the 
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Kurds of both countries. However, what followed was a period of repression.” （Koohi-
Kamali [1992: 189]）Summarizing these circumstances from the vantage point of 
national character, Menashri writes the following. “It has been common practice in 
modern Iran that in times of crisis, when the central government seems weak, the ethnic 
minority groups are the first to contest it.” (Menashri [1988: 229]). 
 In relation to the topic of gender analysis, discussion deriving from the 
standpoints of theorists is particularly wide-ranging. Nashat, however, arrives at the 
conclusion regarding the change in women’s status soon after the revolution, that, “in 
spite of the role played by women in toppling the shah’s regime, women have lost more 
from the change of government than has any other group that participated in the 
revolution.” (Nashat [1980: 165]). 
 Lastly, 4) on the issue of international relations, with relations with America at 
the axis, there has been much discussion – even if we confine our scope to the duration 
of the revolution - of America’s response to the revolution and changes therein, of the 
influence the revolution had on the economics of oil, of the revolution in relation to the 
former Soviet Union, and of an exportation of the revolution into the Islamic world. 
They link either directly or indirectly with the international issues pertaining to Iran 
over the last 30 years, of Iran’s nuclear development and support of Hamas and 
Hezbollah, and the increasing influential power of the Shia sect. A consistent 
undercurrent of the discussions is the view that the revolution in Iran was a failure in 
US diplomacy policy in the Middle East, and that it was the first political success story 
of the present-day Third-World trend for the reconstructionist movement. It cannot be 
said enough how an analysis from this viewpoint, together with a politico-social 
analysis of Iran and Islamic reconstructionism, continues to be a crucial structural 
element in revolutionary theory in Iran up until the present day. 
 Be that as it may, for the majority of those Iranians who experienced the 
revolution, the ideal post-revolutionary society in Iran continues to be a far-off dream. 
In particular, the war with Iraq which lasted from 1980 for 8 years put a great strain 
upon the Iranian people. It is said the war dead from the two countries combined 
amounted to a million, including many of the young generation who took a positive part 
in the revolution; they were sent to the front line to suffer indescribable hardships. 
Whichever far-flung village one visits in present-day Iran, one will find the tombs of 
shahid At the same time as continuing to highlight the unrelenting social truth of death 
by war, their tragic experience at war has come to play an important role in mobilizing 
the people towards unity. 
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 The influence of this war has been prolonged and has gradually penetrated all 
corners of Iran deeply and in various ways. There is probably no farming village or 
hamlet within Iran which has not known shahid (martyrs) from this war. At the same 
time this war provided post-war Iranian society, down to every village, with the various 
prerequisites – systems and manpower - for achieving unity under central control in 
Tehran. Of those the most important channel is the basīj (originally the wartime militia 
organization).  
 During the process of war following the revolution, “the Iranian people”, for 
better or worse, were put into direct contact with the state in a way formerly 
unimaginable. The mobilizing force used to its limit for this purpose was the doctrine 
of the Islamic Shia-sect jihad (holy war). Volunteers (basīj) who fought at the front 
line against the Iraq army, put small Korans in their chest pockets, tied bandanas with 
“god is great” round their heads and defied death. The war dead were treated as shahid 
(people who fell on the path to god), and were buried lavishly in their places of birth 
(not burial grounds).  
 The ideological pillar, “The Iranian people”, which newly came about through 
such severe experiences, differed from the conceptual Aryan nationalism seen widely 
among the city intellectuals of the 1920s to 1940s. Now occupying central position was 
the ideology of the Shia sect, whose territory crosses, but somehow fits into, the 
present-day Iranian border. 
 The Shia sect is a minority in the whole of the Islamic world, but is the 
overwhelming majority in Iran. That distorted consciousness of being of the correct 
lineage, although differing slightly from the Iranian nationalism already mentioned, 
clearly hail each other in some respects. At least, when Iranians talk about Shia sect as 
their own religion, they do so in a way that on one level equates fellow brethren with 
being Iranian. 
 The traditional Iranian social structure of opposing and separate urban and rural 
societies has now altered beyond recognition.  As will be discussed later, statistically 
these changes would appear to have taken place over the last 30 years. The revolution 
was the greatest turning point in the process, and in particular the activities of Jihad 
Sazandegi (Sacred Army of Reconstruction) created by Khomeynī straight after the 
revolution with the aim of eradicating the poverty in remote villages. ii i 
 The concept of Jihad Sazandegi was to promote the social and economic 
independence of village areas, by gradually laying asphalt roads from poor, out-lying 
villages, digging wells, supplying electricity, and building health centers and schools. 
Regardless of how far this concept has been faithfully carried out when confronted by 
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various real obstructions, or whether it has achieved its aims, its activities continued to 
be performed throughout 20 years from the revolution, and we cannot overlook the 
great influence that fact itself has had on society in Iran. 
 
2.  The Rise to Power of President Khātamī, and the Realization of Nationwide Local 
Council Elections 
 The rise to power of President Khātamī in 1997 has been attributed to the 
support from the young generation who constitute a large part of the population, and 
from women who have gained political awareness (For example, Sakurai [2001: 189]). 
Hisaeda Nakanishi emphasizes in particular the large role played by the women’s vote 
(Nakanishi [2002:183]). Also, Khosrokhavar argues that the 3 movements, 1) youth, 2) 
intellectual elite, and 3) women, made the election of President Khātamī possible 
(Khosrokhavar: 2002). However, this understanding is based on observations in urban 
areas centering on Tehran, and does not take into consideration the changes in political 
consciousness taking place in rural Iran. 
  During the war with Iraq which lasted for 8 years after the revolution of 1979, 
troops were mobilized in every village area nationwide, and as a result, brought about 
unprecedented, deep changes in political consciousness and social structure, although 
this varied from rural area to area. Also at that time, as practical measures following 
revolutionary leader Khomeynī’s belief in helping the “oppressed (mostaz`afan)”, Jihad 
Sazandegi conscientiously carried out activities centered on remote village areas, which 
rapidly lessened the psychological and time-wise distances within Iran, and increased at 
once the fluidity of the population. 
  Later, President Khātamī’s dramatic rise to power in May 1997 meant that 
various changes which had advanced within inner society in Iran were reborn into the 
political current. A pre-condition for these changes was the fact that Iran’s traditional 
social structure of an opposing relationship between urban and rural societies – once 
completely isolated from each other – had entirely disappeared due to the improvement 
of living standards in rural areas symbolized by the appearance of small cities, the ease 
of access to core cities, and the vast increase in quantity of information through the 
mass media etc. As previously mentioned, these changes are considered to have taken 
the last 30-40 years since the agricultural reforms which began in 1962. (Goto [2002]) 
 The first round of local council elections (Entekhabat-e showrāha-ye eslāmī) of 
February 26, 1999, the first ever held in Iranian political history, are seen as epoch-
making even among President Khātamī’s national reform policies, and for President 
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Khātamī, who could not make noteworthy internal reforms in his 2nd term, they 
resulted in the main internal achievement during his office. These nationwide 
simultaneous showrā elections were legislated in 1996 (under President Rafsanjani) just 
before President Khātamī’s rise to power, with legal basis found in the revolutionary 
constitution drawn up in 1979. Its origins date back historically to the constitutional 
revolution of 1906, with the addition of democratic concepts during the Mosaddeq 
administration in 1952.  
 It goes without saying that the social structure of Iranian society has undergone 
great transformations in the approximate century between the constitutional revolution 
and the present day, and they can be highlighted by the obvious differences in the laws. 
(Suzuki [2007b]) Nevertheless, we should reemphasize the fact that the establishment 
by President Khātamī of nationwide local councils controlled by direct vote from the 
people - the first time ever in Iran - has significance as the realization of an historical 
debate in modern Iranian history. 
 Below gives an overview of the legal aspects of these present circumstances, 
and then introduces the debates held in newspaper reportage during the 3 rounds of 
elections to date. This will enable us to grasp overall the features of the local showrā 
system which has become the core of local government in Iran since 1999, and 8 years 
of transformation. 
 The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran which was approved by 
people’s vote in December 1979, clearly states in articles 100 and 103 iv  the concept of 
local self-governance in which local administration will operate according to the will of 
the inhabitants of the region. These articles were long disregarded amidst the 8-year 
war with Iraq following the revolution in Iran, but local council elections were at last 
realized with the appearance of President Khātamī who supported the establishment and 
rule of a civil society within the framework of the Islamic regime.  
 Legal basis for the local showrā system in Iran can be found in “the law 
concerning the structure, duties, election and mayoral appointment of Islamic showrā” 
which was adopted by parliament on May 22, 1996, roughly a year before President 
Khātamī was elected, and which was amended on May 27, July 27 and September 28, 
2003 following the 2nd round of nationwide local council elections. If we trace legal 
history for this law, it is possible to return as far as the Eyālat (province) and Velāyat 
(district) Anjomans Bill submitted to the Iranian national parliament on April 21, 1907, 
and it can also be seen in the “Farmers’ Share Expansion and Agricultural Development 
Organizations Bill” submitted September 1952 to the national parliament during the 
heightened rural nationalism of Mosaddeq’s term as Prime Minister, and laws and 
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amendment bills made thereafter until 1970s regarding “village (deh) anjomans”, as 
well as any laws directly preceding it. 
 Here let us take a general view of the content of the 1996 local showrā bill. 
Article 1 of it states “In order to rapidly advance plans for prosperity such as in society, 
economics, development, insurance, culture and education, with the cooperation of the 
people and in response to local situations, administration of each village, county, city, 
district and province is carried out under the supervision of village showrā, district 
showrā, city showrā, county showrā and province showrā.” 
 Article 17 of the same bill states “Village, city and suburb (shahrak) councillor 
elections are carried out by direct and general voting, through anonymous vote and the 
method of relative majority.” It is clear that in this new local administrative system, 
village showrā and city showrā are chosen by direct vote of the inhabitants, and that 
forms the basis of the system. 
The local showrā elections of February 1999, the first ever to be carried out in 
modern Iranian history, were, thus, based on the local showrā bill of 1996 which was a 
concrete regulating of the stipulations in Articles 100-103 of the 1979 revolutionary 
constitution. Here I present arguments found in newspaper reports which appeared 
during the local showrā elections held in 3 rounds. This helps us to understand the 
gradual transition in acceptance of the new local administrative system by the 
intellectual elite mainly in Tehran. 
The 1st showrā council election held on February 26, 1999 was the first occasion 
of its kind in the history of Iran, and was accepted enthusiastically by the Iranian 
people as a symbol of the Khātamī government’s reform policy. One newspaper, Nashat, 
writes on April 19, 1999 that the “showrā committee is now realized after 100 years of 
effort,” reflecting on the history of the showrā system which had been the dream of the 
Iranian people for 100 years. 
Another newspaper, Iran, writes on February 23, 1999 that the “showrā system 
expands the free space for people’s discussions,” and expresses its hope for a complete 
change of face in Iranian cities and villages. On the other hand, the Qods paper of 
February 25, 1999 cites Supreme Leader Khāmeneī’s words as “people should vote for 
experienced, pious, and affectionate persons, not for persons eager for fame, bread, and 
high position,” thus warning against opportunists who want to exploit people’s 
excitement. 
Another paper, Zan, writes on January 5, 1999 that 7,251 women stood for the 
election, and Āriyā reports just after the election on March 1, 1999 that “women won 
the showrā election in several cities,” citing the cities of Bahār and Lālejīn, both in 
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Hamedān Province, with Sāleh-ābād and Pārs-ābād in Ardabīl Province. The Towse‘e 
paper also reports on the same day that 10 female showrā council members were elected 
in Semnān Province. 
These few examples show how enthusiastically the majority of the nation 
accepted the 1st showrā election in city and village alike, and how it became a political 
event symbolizing the reformist policy of president Khātamī’s government. At the same 
time, this election was the first such experience for most city and village citizens, and 
several unexpected occurrences followed. For example, the Resālat paper writes on 
January 12, 1999 that in about 6% of villages the election would not be held (because 
the number of candidates did not reach the regulation).  
In addition, on January 21, 1999 the Jomhūrī-ye Eslāmī paper reports that 
Parliament decided that “showrā council elections in communities of pastoral nomads 
should be held by March 20, 1999”, suggesting that some showrā council elections in 
communities of pastoral nomads were set at a different time. In this way, there were, 
not surprisingly, variations in the activities of the newly established nationwide showrā 
councils in each town and village, and also the law was amended in 2003 upon the 
discovery of legal imperfections.  
The 2nd showrā election, held on February 28, 2003, reflected the experiences 
of the first showrās in all of the communities, and in most of the cases that election was 
more practical than symbolic in nature. At the same time, however, the result of the 
election in large cities, including Tehran, clearly showed a political trend in favor of 
conservatives, and newspaper reports did not appear to convey any of the fervor present 
in rural village areas. 
The voting rates of this election, especially in large cities, were at a remarkably 
low level. The Khorāsān paper wrote on March 4, 1999 that “the national average 
voting rate of citizens in showrā elections is about 50%,” and the rates for individual 
provinces show that Tehran was lower than 24%. But another side of this story is that 
the new administrative system permeated rural societies; in many of the villages, the 
dehyārī (village chief) was appointed after this election. An analytical article appeared 
in the Hambastegī paper on November 15, 2006 before the 3rd election and concluded 
that “comparing the results of the elections, the average school career of the elected in 
the 2nd election is higher than the 1st, which shows that people who are more skilled in 
practical affairs are expected to become councillors”. 
What then of the 3rd - most recent - showrā election? The election was held on 
December 15, 2006, the same day as the specialist council. The results were generally 
discussed as showing an early decline of support for President Ahmadīnezhād, a 
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conclusion mostly based on results in larger cities. The truth of the matter is, most 
newspaper reportage concentrated on this point, for example, the Hamshahri reported 
on December 10 while votes were still being counted, that “the reformists have taken 
39.7% of seats, winning over the conservatives”. On the other hand, the conservative-
leaning Keihān had an eminent theorist announce on December 21, “The reformists’ 
declaration of victory in this election is no more than self-deception”, and on December 
23, it diverts attention with deputy head of parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar’s 
words, “Showrā are not the place for political proclamations and debates”.  
Yet, seen from the viewpoint of the way in which the new administrative system 
was established in rural societies, the differences are obviously widening between the 
communities that adopted the new system and those that did not. 
According to statements made by Mr. A. Nouruzi of the city of Torkamānchāy in 
East Āzarbāyjān Province in an interview in November 2005, straight after the 
revolution all rural matters were decided centrally, and there were many inconsistencies. 
However, today the showrā of each province, representing all town and village showrā, 
submit official pleas to ministers, and according to the outcome, provincial authorities 
plan their own budgets for the year. (Nouruzi himself became the first chief councillor 
of the East Āzarbāyjān Province showrā). 
 The next section departs for a time from the issue of the post-revolutionary 
political process, and attempts an examination of how far provincial administrative 
reforms in Iran progressed on the level of local finances during the Khātamī 
government.  
 
3.  Transformation of Local Finances under Khātamī’s Term 
 As already discussed, President Khātamī’s national reforms had as their 
background the structural changes in Iranian society brought on by the 1979 revolution 
and the subsequent war with Iraq. The increase in rūstā-shahr (small cities in village 
areas straddling a city and village) which had continued to multiply all over Iran during 
this period, and the transformation of Iranian society symbolized by these, meant the 
dissolution of the previous, traditional city-village relationship, and the minimalization 
of living space for existing communities of pastoral nomads.  
 In response to these new circumstances, President Khātamī put into practice the 
bill of 1996 calling for nationwide uniform local showrā elections - which had already 
been stipulated in the 1979 revolutionary constitution – letting each town and village of 
Iran choose a representative of its inhabitants by direct vote.  
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 In so doing, local administration in Iran achieved an inversion of its system: 
from a top-down to bottom-up arrangement. However, to what extent was this realized 
in actual situations? Despite quite limited data, the aim of this section is to give some 
investigation over to this question.  
 The 3rd lot of 5-year plans for Iran presented in 2000 contained a clause on 
decentralization, stating the need to “transfer a part of administrative authority from 
central government to local government” (Anon [2000]). Our points of examination 
here are to what extent such an objective provides direction for government policies, 
and whether it is reflected at all in the national budget. 
 Under discussion below is President Khātamī’s period of office lasting 2 terms 
over the 8 years from August 1997 until August 2005, however here I compare local 
finances in the national budget for the year preceding the administration, 1996-7 (1375 
by the Iranian calendar; for simplification’s sake 1996 used here), and the most recent 
data available to date, that is for the year 2003-4 (1382; 2003 used here). v 
 An overview of the national budget for the years 1996 and 2003, Table 1-1 is a 
correlation of data for those years from the Central Bank Report (Central Bank [1997; 
2005]) and Statistics Almanac (Statistical Centre [2000]; [2004]; [2005]). There were 
wide-sweeping changes between 1996 and 2003 in the method of totaling the national 
budget, so that there could not be complete equivalence, however I put together data for 
1996 by supplementing figures for “local annual expenditure” and “acquisition of local 
property” with data from Statistics Almanac. Also, when applying methods of totalling 
to conditions in 2003, care is necessary as the “general state income” for 1996 is 
24529.9 BR, yet this is quoted as a total with the “sale of oil” (57275.6 BR) in the 
Central Bank Report. 
 Initially striking about this table is the 4-fold increase in budget size between 
1996 and 2003. However, as is clear from the example of oil income, much of the 
increase during that period should be understood as being offset by the severe inflation 
within Iran. In order to gain an overall glimpse of this period, the 2 right-hand columns 
in Table 1-1 are calculated from Iranian oil export quantities which make public the oil 
income to the Iranian national treasury, and the international price of oil. vi  These 
provide a structure for comparison of state finances in Iran in 1996 which use oil 
income as a standard (100).  
 This reveals to some extent the change in national finances in Iran between the 
fiscal years of 1996-7 and 2003-4. Despite the general state income staying with a 
slight increase, national general expenditure increased dramatically, with national and 
local annual expenditures both nearly doubling. On the other hand, non-financial asset 
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gains, meaning governmental development expenditure, and state assets both remained 
level, which suggests minus value considering the increase in oil income during the 
period. 
 Also during this time, influence of the reform line led by 7 years of the Khātamī 
government clearly spread as far as national finances, a remarkable increase being 
visible in tax revenue, the foundation of the ruling state. On the other hand, we can 
detect that the national budget of Iran, which was more or less balanced for the year 
1996, had a deficit appropriation for 2003. However, a lot of this has to do with 
alteration in totaling methods of the Iran national budget, and should not be 
considered simply as an increase in deficit. Of more interest to us here is the change 
involving a great leap upwards in local annual expenditure within the national general 
expenditure（26.6→51.5）, and the slight reduction in the acquisition of local property 
within the acquisition of non-financial assets (development expenditure) 
（12.3→12.1）.  
 My hypothesis regarding local annual expenditure within the national general 
expenditure was that “content-wise, it uses local tax revenue etc. in each province as its 
source of funds, and the scope of discretion of each province is far greater than 
‘national development expenditure’ which includes expenditure of the national 
treasury” (Suzuki [1999: 118]). The aforementioned changes are, then, significant as 
local finances have responded to a certain extent in accordance with the formation of 
nationwide town-village showrā councils in Iran since 1999. 
 Tables 1-2 and 1-3 use different data to calculate the “degree of autonomy in 
local finances vii ”, and how local annual expenditure per inhabitant in each province 
changed. The figures used here are based on data from Statistics Almanac for each year, 
however, due to changes in the administrative districts in Iran during that time, the 
number of provinces nationwide has increased from 25 in 1996 to 30 in 2003. For 
reasons of calculating totals, I suggest observation on the basis of the administrative 
districts (25 provinces) of the year 1996.  
 It should first be said that in Tables 1-2 and 1-3 provinces are ordered in size of 
population. Judging from a mere glance down the tables, there is a certain tendency in 
the degree of financial autonomy and expenditure per inhabitant in relation to 
population scale of provinces. In particular, on the matter of expenditure per inhabitant, 
it is clear that compared with Tehran Province, which tops the list of large-scale 
provinces, small-scale provinces with populations of less than a million have a higher 
figure. In contrast, despite there being some variability regarding degree of financial 
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autonomy, there is an overall tendency for large-scale provinces to surpass small-scale 
ones. vii i 
 It is also clear from Table 1-1 that between 1996 and 2003, degree of self-
autonomy in local financial expenditure in Iran rose on a nationwide scale from 0.684 
to 0.692. Concerning the meaning of this on the rural town/village level, of reference is 
a statement made in March, 2001 by the then Mayor of Varzane City, Mr Q.Qasemi, 
who will be introduced in detail in Chapter 4. “Thanks to the showrā council bill, 
basically all administrative decision-making rights now rest with the showrā council. 
Municipal budget decisions and management, as well as election of a mayor, are the 
main duties of the city showrā. At present, all budget spending by the city office must 
be reported to the showrā council. Before we reported centrally, but now this has 
changed to reporting to each showrā. Residents discuss issues concerning municipal 
government directly with showrā councillors, and the showrā council addresses the city 
office. A system which incorporated the detailed requests of residents never existed 
before.” It is somewhat doubtful whether this new system functions adequately in all 
cities of Iran; however, we can safely say that in general, reforms have begun to be 
made in these directions since the holding of showrā elections in 1999. 
 Assuming this to be the case, Graph 1-1 indicates the position in graph form of 
financial expenditure in each province and expenditure per person in relation to the 
nationwide figure, and also the changes over 7 years. Each province is numbered 
showing at the same time the order of population size, so that we can observe any 
tendencies associated with population scale. 
 A close focus on each province in these tables and graphs identifies an overall 
tendency: there are many provinces where, in relative comparison with national worth, 
the degree of autonomy in financial expenditure and expenditure per person have to 
some extent a bartering relationship. On the other hand it is noticeable that there are 
some provinces between 1996 and 2003 that were financially fortunate, and those in 
contrast that were surrounded by misfortune.  
 Examples are Zanjān Province which is particularly financially fortunate, as is 
Yazd Province compared with other provinces. In contrast, Gilan and Kerman Provinces 
appear relatively badly off financially.  
 It would be difficult to clarify all the reasons for these situations, but we can at 
least surmise the reason for the fortune of Zanjān Province comparatively easily.  
Following long-term confusion and conflict over the reversion of Qazvin region after 
the 1979 revolution ix , Qazvin District became independent from Zanjān Province, 
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forming Qazvin Province. We can assume this meant it was accompanied by 
compensation. 
 However, if we remove such exceptional cases, we can recognize those whose 
degree of autonomy in financial expenditure and expenditure per person have to some 
extent a bartering relationship. Those which stand out as experiencing particularly large 
relative change during the period are Khuzestan, Hormozgan, Bushehr and Ilam 
Provinces. Apart from Ilam, they are all provinces along the Persian Gulf, while Ilam is 
a province on the border with central-southern Iraq.  
 Others with similar tendencies of relative change are East Āzarbāyjān and West 
Āzarbāyjān Provinces out of the 3 provinces belonging to the Āzarbāyjān region. Only 
Ardabil Province, a new province with great demands upon development, has several 
points of interest in that it shows different movements such as in the direction of 
expansion of expenditure per person.  
 Above, we have examined the changes in local finances on the provincial level 
using what can be deduced from broad data on the national budget of Iran. It has 
become clear that, throughout Khātamī’s term from 1997 to 2005, local finances in Iran 
tended towards a shift in the direction of respecting the autonomy of towns and villages 
- if external causes are eliminated such as unconnected or accidental circumstances, and 
international relations. In this way, together with the formation of showrā councils in 
each town and village by direct vote of the inhabitants, the great inversion of the local 
administration system in Iran from a top-down to bottom-up arrangement was a 
remarkable transformation. 
 
3.  The Reformists’ Waning and Ahmadīnezhād’s Rise to Power 
 Between the local council elections of 1999 and the 6th round of parliamentary 
elections in February 2000, there occurred a political incident that was to prove an 
extremely important turning point for the reformists with President Khātamī as their 
political leader. It was a bloody act of suppression by the police authorities against a 
reformist students’ demonstration in Tehran on July 9-11, 1999. Because Khātamī could 
not display a resolute attitude towards the authorities, some reformist supporters began 
to harbor doubts about the president’s attitude towards his role as defender of 
democracy, and hurled severe criticism at him. 
 Nevertheless, at this stage the nation’s expectation of reforms to the system 
under Khātamī’s lead still widely remained, and of these, the parliamentary elections 
held in February 2000 saw the result of reformists gaining an overwhelming majority in 
the ministers elected. At the same time this election process watched closely the 
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exposure of the corruption over many years of aforementioned former president, 
Rafsanjani, and as a result of that, Rafsanjani lost in the 1st round of voting, and in the 
2nd, bore the insult of the lowest vote.  
 On June 8, 2001 the 8th round of presidential elections took place, and in the 
vote count of the next day Khātamī’s 2nd term as president was decided. The 
presidential elections took place amidst a worsened international environment through a 
setback in the Middle East peace process caused by hasty involvement in the Jerusalem 
issue at the end of the Clinton administration, a strong rollback of the conservatives, a 
standstill in reform power, and a spreading despair among the populace at Khātamī-led 
reform policies. Despite this, the results of the election concluded in an overwhelming 
victory for President Khātamī. Although voting numbers had dropped from the 83% of 
the previous round (1997) to 67%, judging from the fact that the previous presidential 
elections had been taken over by the drama of Khātamī’s rise, these were unpredictably 
high percentages.  
 After President Khātamī was re-elected in June 2001, as is well-known, 
simultaneous terrorist attacks occurred in America on September 11 of the same year, at 
once heightening the fluidity of the political maps of the Middle East and Iran. On 
September 13 of the same year, the Taliban, effective ruler of eastern neighbor, 
Afghanistan, took flight, and in American President, Bush’s State of the Union message 
to Congress at the beginning of the following year, Iran was named alongside Iraq and 
North Korea as an “axis of evil”. Ironically it was Khātamī’s cause - which 5 years 
earlier had aimed at internal reform - that became gradually cornered amidst changes in 
the balance of international politics, and essentially came to an end.  
 Results of the 2nd round of nationwide local council elections held in February 
2003 were, at least, often mentioned in the mass media in connection with the 
parliamentary elections of 1 year later. However, the importance of the 2nd ever local 
council elections in Iran obviously cannot be ignored, and comparison with the 7th 
parliamentary elections, precisely because it is based on differences, is well worth 
doing accurately. One meaning for Iranian society of these local council elections 
perhaps lay in rural village areas, which saw advancing social selection and an increase 
in difference between those few villages with more development potential, and the rest 
that were more stagnant. Leader personalities rose more distinctly in the 2nd round of 
elections which led on from the 1st round, and core villages with future development 
potential and villages without were gradually sorted out from each other. The tendency 
then revealed itself for the gap between villages to become ever wider. 
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 The schedule for the 7th round of parliamentary elections of the following year 
was declared on December 13, 2003 by the Ministry of Home Affairs as set for 
February 2, 2004. However, as the conservative stronghold of the Council for 
Protecting the Constitution disqualified more than 3000 individuals including about 80 
incumbent reformist ministers in the preliminary vetting of the 8000 applications, the 
80 incumbent ministers carried out a protest sit-down (tahasson). On January 21 Deputy 
President Mohammad Ali Abtahi submitted his resignation along with several cabinet 
members. The candidacy of around 200 names that had been rejected first off on 
January 20 was acknowledged, and on February 4 revolutionary leader, Khāmeneī 
declared the election would proceed as expected.  
 Under suspicion of developing nuclear weapons, the strict stance towards Iran 
of America’s Bush administration was unwavering. In these circumstances, the route to 
reform, led by Khātamī from inside the present Islamic system, experienced a string of 
failures since his government’s inauguration, and at this point had lost most of its 
appeal for the nation. Because of that, victory to the conservatives had already been 
decided as the outcome of the elections in the governmental center, Tehran, and 
remaining concern focused almost entirely on how far voting numbers would stretch.  
 The 5 nationwide elections after the 7th round of presidential elections in which 
President Khātamī came to power in 1997 until the local council elections of 2003, 
despite limitations in the system, were elections where voters’ sense of participation 
brought to them a democratic meaning unlike any previous election (Baktiari [2002]). 
They took place upon a background of nationwide changes in social structure 
originating in influence from the 1979 revolution in Iran, the subsequent village area 
focus policy, and the 8-year Iran-Iraq War. They also signaled great transformation, 
helping overturn at its roots the situation prior to this of political trends in Iran only 
moving with urban areas. 
 Despite this essential transformation in social consciousness, change in the 
international environment after September 11, 2001 hastened the retreat of reformist 
power, with the parliamentary elections of February 2004 confirming this, and 
becoming a point of historical reversal when the presidential elections of the next year, 
2005, saw the rise of President Ahmadīnezhād. One might say the signs were already 
visible in the 2003 local council elections, and the 7th parliamentary election process 
took democratization in Iran back superficially to the level of pre-1997. They were 
antidemocratic elections which used any restrictions in the system to the full, such as 
the disqualification of candidates by the Council for Protecting the Constitution. The 
problem lies in the fact that the post-revolutionary generation, who had already 
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experienced advancing democratization on a backdrop of changing social structure, 
held no hopes for the political state of affairs. Present-day political authority has 
decisively lost its centripetal force for the youth who constitute over half of the nation.  
 The 7th round of presidential elections of February 2004 were regarded from the 
start as an important turning point for Iranian politics, and in truth most of the elected 
ministers came from the conservatives. The election results meant essentially the end of 
President Khātamī’s road to reforms, and the conservatives’ grip on power in the 
presidential elections of June 2005 became almost a certainty. 
 The 9th round of presidential elections in Iran were held on June 2005, and 
Mahmoud Ahmadīnezhād was elected of the hard-line conservatives x  whose support 
was based on the Revolutionary Defense Force, creating a new political current (Suzuki 
[2006]). Iran witnessed the retreat of the reformists during the election amidst the 
people’s deep sense of disappointment at the Khātamī administration which had been 
unable to deliver any system reforms over the previous few years. However, the results 
of the 2005 presidential elections announced the advent of a new political season in a 
landscape with a greater voice for the Revolutionary Defense Force (sepah-e pasdaran). 
The Journal of Democracy picked up on the 9th round of presidential elections of June 
2005 in which President Ahmadīnezhād was elected, and compiled a special issue, 
“Iran’s Peculiar Election”. In the opening article, V. Nasr, having indicated the 
tendency to conservatize in Iran, states the following. 
 “Another development that set the context for the 2005 election was the growing 
importance of local politics. Under Khatami, various factions began hotly contesting 
municipal and provincial elections. Tehran, which is far and away Iran’s largest city as 
well as its capital, declined in relative political importance. Broad national issues had 
to vie for voter attention with local matters. This meant that patronage and bread-and-
butter concerns were rising in salience even as the ability to mount a truly nationwide 
campaign was becoming crucial. This trend was clearly evident by 2004, when 
conservative candidates swept municipal elections by means of well-run campaigns 
focusing on economic issues. This lesson was not lost on Ahmedinejad’s campaign.” 
(Nasr [2005: 12-13]). 
 One reason Ahmadīnezhād gained a large vote might well have been the spread 
of wrong-doing from inside Iranian society. Society in Iran had undergone 
unprecedented change since the acceptance of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution Rule 598 of August 1988 which was “like drinking poison” (Khomeynī’s 
words). Reckless socio-economic development and fierce change on a daily basis, 
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competition through sharp practice and wrong-doing. No longer in society in Iran, even 
in village areas, should one look for settled lives based on the traditional family.  
 Amidst such fierce socio-economic change, it was the Rafsanjani Family which 
symbolized reconstruction of prosperity after the war with Iraq, and it is said that he 
and his family carved themselves out a great fortune as a lever for post-war 
reconstruction enterprises. Supreme Leader Khāmeneī, and even President Khātamī who 
had appeared with a fresh image in 1997 advocating reforms and lawful rule, had made 
just empty promises in the people’s eyes, and seemed mere puppets of the fat-cat 
privileged class at the pivot of power in Iran. 
 Ahmadīnezhād held up the youth volunteer force (basīj) during the Iran-Iraq 
War as “exemplary humans”. In the background are those several tens of thousand war 
dead who died on the front line, and their families nationwide. As families of martyrs 
(shahid) their livings are guaranteed by the national treasury, so that in elections they 
are counted among the conservatives. Furthermore, the outer-edge existence is 
acknowledged of wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians who lost family 
members in air raids, and they all play the role of a linchpin guaranteeing the unity of 
post-war Iranian society. 
 However, at the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that the result of the 
transformation of local administration as a direct result of reform policies advocated by 
President Khātamī, and systematic mobilization of the belief in self-governance that 
came about in post-revolution and post-war regional and village society, actually paved 
the way for the rise of revolutionary hardliner, President Ahmadīnezhād.  
 The conservative tendencies of Iranian policies from the appearance of a new 
president in 2005 until the present day, in addition to the superficial slogan calling this 
a recurring revolutionary period, had, then, an aspect that should be considered an 
irreversible consequence of the rapid structural change of society in Iran in post-
revolutionary rural town-village areas. Of course, it cannot be overstated that the 
increasing influence of America’s anti-Iranian diplomatic encircling net following the 
9.11 terrorist attacks was a major cause in the rise to power of President Ahmadīnezhād.  
 Rising from this post-revolutionary attempt at a democratic election system in 
Iran, President Ahmadīnezhād has toured round the country giving talks with much 
fervor, and listening directly to “the people’s demands” – taking over the showrā 
system introduced during Khātamī’s term - allowing residents to write letters addressed 
to the president. However, this kind of popularist method, on a background of greater 
voice for the Revolutionary Defense Force, doubtless stops short of attaining the true 
feelings of the people of the nation who experienced revolution and war first-hand.  
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Table 1-1　Results summary of the national general finances of the Khatami term in Iran 
1996/7(1) 2003/4(1) 1996/7(2) 2003/4(2)
General state income 24,529.9 78,836.6 74.9 90.7
1.Tax revenue 12,560.2 65,099.0 38.4 74.9
2.Other income 11,969.7 13,737.6 36.5 15.8
National general expenditures 37,571.2 178,255.2 114.7 205.2
1.National annual expenditure 28,863.8 133,521.6 88.1 153.7
2.Local annual expenditure 8,707.4 44,733.6 26.6 51.5
Sale of nonfinancial assets 129,030.9 0.0 148.5
1.Oil income 32,745.7 128,153.9 100.0 147.5
2.Other sale 877.0 0.0 1.0
Acquisition of nonfinancial assets（Development expenditure） 19,211.9 60,982.9 58.7 70.2
1.Acquisition of state assets 15,193.6 50,446.7 46.4 58.1
2.Acquisition of local property 4,018.3 10,536.2 12.3 12.1
Income and outgo of the national treasury 492.5 -31,370.6 1.5 -36.1
（Note1）Unit is BR（billion rials）.
（Note2）The relative value at the time of setting the oil income in the 1996 fiscal year to 100.
（Source）Based on data from Central Bank[1997]; ［2004］ and Statistical Centre[2000].
18 Hormozgan 152,717 137,291 290,008 1,062,155 27.3
 and the unit for f is
Table 1-2　Local finance situations according to province in the year 1996/7
Name of Province a.Generaexpenditu
l
res
b.Dev
expen
elopment
diture
c.Gross
expenditure
d.Degree of
autonomy e.Population
f. outlay per
one person
Whole country 8,707,354 4,018,290 12,725,644 0.684 60,055,488 21.2
1 Tehran 1,251,181 238,362 1,489,543 0.840 12,029,283 12.4
2 Khorasan 866,100 291,848 1,157,948 0.748 6,047,661 19.1
3 Mazandaran 670,430 264,544 934,974 0.717 4,028,296 23.2
4 Esfahan 573,582 150,489 724,071 0.792 3,923,255 18.5
5 Fars 619,941 237,275 857,216 0.723 3,817,036 22.5
6 Khuzestan 494,381 619,869 1,114,250 0.444 3,746,772 29.7
7 East Azerbaijan 434,138 202,899 637,037 0.681 3,325,540 19.2
8 West Azerbaijan 336,863 161,617 498,480 0.676 2,496,320 20.0
9 Gilan 385,281 134,979 520,260 0.741 2,241,896 23.2
10 Kerman 379,651 153,569 533,220 0.712 2,004,328 26.6
11 Kermanshah 262,989 199,089 462,078 0.569 1,778,596 26.0
12 Sistan va Baluchestan 221,946 207,162 429,108 0.517 1,722,579 24.9
13 Hamedan 239,594 87,269 326,863 0.733 1,677,957 19.5
14 Lorestan 254,331 114,426 368,757 0.690 1,584,434 23.3
15 Kurdistan 205,060 111,255 316,315 0.648 1,346,383 23.5
16 Central 198,168 74,035 272,203 0.728 1,228,812 22.2
17 Ardabil 172,046 114,217 286,263 0.601 1,168,011 24.5
0.527
19 Zanjan 157,798 104,413 262,211 0.602 1,036,873 25.3
20 Chaharmahal va Bakhtiyari 153,908 73,577 227,485 0.677 761,168 29.9
21 Yazd 159,029 53,594 212,623 0.748 750,769 28.3
22 Bushehr 152,076 77,506 229,582 0.662 743,675 30.9
23 Kohgiluye va Boyerahmad 132,202 87,119 219,321 0.603 544,356 40.3
24 Semnan 115,884 47,349 163,233 0.710 501,447 32.6
25 Ilam 118,056 74,538 192,594 0.613 487,886 39.5
（Note1）Data of a and b are the budget after-compensation for the year 1375. The unit for a, b and c is 1 million rials,
10 thousand rials.
（Note2）Data of e is based on the population census of 1996. Population of Qom Province is included in Tehran Province.
（Note3）d is calculated as a/c, and f is calculated as c/e.
（Source）Based on data from Statistical Centre［2000： 63, 751, 756］.
Hormozgan 957,453 0.476 1,062,155 189.2
 and the unit for f is 10
Table 1-3　Local finance situations according to province in the year 2003/4 
Name of Province a.Geexpe
neral
nditures
b.Developme
expenditure
nt c.Gross
expenditure
d.Degr
autono
ee of
my e.Population
f. outlay per
one person
Whole country 46,251,447 20,603,360 66,854,807 0.692 60,055,488 111.3
1 Tehran 6,787,627 1,372,483 8,160,110 0.832 12,029,283 67.8
2 Khorasan 4,533,641 1,851,230 6,384,871 0.710 6,047,661 105.6
3 Mazandaran 3,696,729 1,098,802 4,795,531 0.771 4,028,296 119.0
4 Esfahan 2,934,073 757,481 3,691,554 0.795 3,923,255 94.1
5 Fars 3,311,634 1,180,378 4,492,012 0.737 3,817,036 117.7
6 Khuzestan 2,649,416 2,131,765 4,781,181 0.554 3,746,772 127.6
7 East Azerbaijan 2,126,151 916,874 3,043,025 0.699 3,325,540 91.5
8 West Azerbaijan 1,726,027 648,181 2,374,208 0.727 2,496,320 95.1
9 Gilan 1,835,758 654,810 2,490,568 0.737 2,241,896 111.1
10 Kerman 1,771,209 924,146 2,695,355 0.657 2,004,328 134.5
11 Kermanshah 1,380,755 864,298 2,245,053 0.615 1,778,596 126.2
12 Sistan va Baluchestan 1,161,984 1,091,063 2,253,047 0.516 1,722,579 130.8
13 Hamedan 1,232,300 455,930 1,688,230 0.730 1,677,957 100.6
14 Lorestan 1,389,394 706,621 2,096,015 0.663 1,584,434 132.3
15 Kurdistan 1,028,607 620,293 1,648,900 0.624 1,346,383 122.5
16 Central 1,002,515 485,867 1,488,382 0.674 1,228,812 121.1
17 Ardabil 953,861 456,801 1,410,662 0.676 1,168,011 120.8
18 1,052,574 2,010,027
19 Zanjan 1,431,876 667,554 2,099,430 0.682 1,036,873 202.5
20 Chaharmahal va Bakhtiyari 799,436 364,222 1,163,658 0.687 761,168 152.9
21 Yazd 936,165 291,474 1,227,639 0.763 750,769 163.5
22 Bushehr 776,751 756,910 1,533,661 0.506 743,675 206.2
23 Kohgiluye va Boyerahmad 660,361 476,855 1,137,216 0.581 544,356 208.9
24 Semnan 557,349 260,569 817,918 0.681 501,447 163.1
25 Ilam 610,373 516,179 1,126,552 0.542 487,886 230.9
（Note1）Data of a and b are the budget after-compensation for the year 1382. The unit for a, b and c is 1 million rials,
thousand rials.
(Note2) Some data of a and b are adjusted in order to correspond to the number of the states of Table 1-2.
（Note3）Data of e is based on the population census of 1996. Population of Qom Province is included in Tehran Province.
（Note4）d is calculated as a/c, and f is calculated as c/e.
（Source）Based on data from Statistical Centre［2005： 90, 749, 753］.
 
 
